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ABSTRACT
It is frequently claimed that some employers act to maximise 
short-term gains at the expense of long-term rewards, hence 
reducing the level of employee training. In addition, during 
a recession such employers are expected to be the keenest 
to make further cutbacks. This paper examines the empirical 
validity of these two claims by examining the links between 
three proxies for short-termism and the incidence and volume 
of training activity as well as recession-induced changes to 
training expenditure and the proportion of the workforce 
trained. The results are based on establishment-level data 
taken from 67,599 private sector employers in England in 2009 
and enriched with data from other sources (with sample sizes 
falling accordingly). The results suggest that short-termism 
plays a role in explaining both the level of training activity 
supported by employers and its sensitivity to the economic 
cycle. However, the results are rather ambiguous with 
one of the proxies suggesting that, contrary to theoretical 
reasoning, training incidence and volume is higher, not lower, 
in establishments which belong to stock market listed rather 
than unlisted enterprises. To make further analytical headway, 
then, direct measures of short-termism are needed rather than 
indirect, albeit improved, measures of the type used here.
1. Introduction
In Anglo-Saxon economies, there is a widespread belief that employers are averse 
to making investments which may generate large returns in the future if this 
requires sacrifices in the present. This ‘short-termist’ mentality has featured in 
political discussions of the comparative performance of the UK economy prompt-
ing statements such as ‘short-termism seems hard wired into our economy’ (Ed 
Miliband, former Leader of the Opposition, Financial Times, 19 January Miliband, 
2012). The concern is that short-termism places UK businesses at a comparative 
© 2016 The author(s). Published by Informa uK limited, trading as Taylor & francis group.
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2  A. FElsTEAd
disadvantage with competitors, particularly those from Germany and Japan, where 
there is a stronger focus on developing long-term productive capacity (BIS, 2012; 
Gospel & Pendleton, 2005). Investments in activities such as research and develop-
ment (R&D), replenishing the capital stock and other items which might improve 
future economic performance are, therefore, lower in the UK than elsewhere and 
more susceptible to cutbacks in recession.
While the existing literature on short-termism on business behaviour has 
focused on uncovering the link between short-termism and patterns of research 
expenditure, product development and investment in new equipment (e.g. Hughes, 
2014; Demirag, 1998), its impact on training activity has received scant attention. 
Yet developing the skills of workers through training is a well established means 
of increasing the productive capacity of human resources and as such is a key 
aspect of human resource management (HRM) (Boxall, Purcell, & Wright, 2007). 
However, like other long-term investments, the fear is that it may come under 
threat in times of recession (e.g. UKCES, 2008). The contribution of this paper is 
a twofold response to this neglect. First, it presents new empirical evidence which 
tests the claim that short-termism reduces the level of training activity employ-
ers are willing to fund. Secondly, it sheds new light on the fear that in recession 
short-termist employers are the most likely to cut training activity (cf. Felstead, 
Green, & Jewson, 2012). However, given the single country focus of the data used, 
the argument that UK employers are more short-termist than their international 
counterparts cannot be ruled out.
The paper is structured accordingly. Section 2 outlines the literature on 
short-termism and identifies two sources of this behaviour. The first is generated 
‘outside’ the firm by capital markets and the ownership structure of the business. 
This is exemplified by the impact that stock market listing is reckoned to have on 
organisational behaviour through the greater emphasis it places on share price 
growth and dividend payouts. The second source of short-termism is ‘internal’ to 
the firm and is, in principle, more widespread. It stems from managers’ own pref-
erences for short-term results that serve personal interests even if at the expense 
of long-term business benefits. Such opportunistic managerial behaviour is based 
managers’ desire to quickly build a reputation for delivery before moving on to 
other roles.
In this paper, these two sources of short-termism are proxied by the survey 
measures and enhancement procedures outlined in Section 3. These are then 
used to analyse data taken from an establishment-level survey of human resource 
managers carried out in England in 2009 and referred to as the National Employer 
Skills Survey 2009 (NESS2009). Using data taken from the 67,599 (and sub-sets 
thereof) private sector establishments which took part, the paper examines the 
association that short-termism has with the level of employer-sponsored train-
ing and recession-induced movements in this activity – as measured by training 
expenditure per capita and the proportion of employees trained. However, the 
survey items which relate to short-termism have limitations and so only provide 
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first approximations. These drawbacks are addressed by importing information 
from elsewhere into the primary data source. This represents an important meth-
odological contribution to the debate. The two-part presentation of the results 
in Section 4 reflects this approach. The first is a descriptive account of how the 
original proxies for short-termism – based on survey items in NESS2009 – relate 
to the incidence of employer provided training, the volume of provision and its 
susceptibility to recession-induced change. The second set of results uses multi-
variate analyses to identify whether short-termism – where possible measured by 
improved proxies – has a significant impact on the decision to provide any training 
at all, the amount of training undertaken and the effect of recession on training 
activity, after holding other factors constant. Section 5 concludes by highlighting 
the need for more direct measures of short-termism rather than relying on indi-
rect, albeit improved, measures of the type used here.
2. Existing literature
It is frequently pointed out that UK expenditure on long-term investment is lower 
than in competitor nations such as Germany, France and the US. According to 
one survey over 70% of business leaders put this down to short-termism (Cox, 
2013, pp. 14–18); that is, decisions ‘that generate an early pay-off relative to strat-
egies what would have added much more value, but at a significantly later point 
in time’ (Barker, 2012, p. 3).
The nature of corporate governance, and in particular the influence of the 
stock market on decision-making behaviour, is often cited as the source of this 
myopia (Laverty, 1996). The theory is that managers of listed companies operate 
under governance structures which give the interests of shareholders primacy 
– known as the ‘outsider-orientated’ model (Gospel & Pendleton, 2005). Shares 
in listed companies can be bought and sold on stock markets. This means that 
ownership can come to rest with ‘external’ shareholders whose connection to the 
business is purely financial and often fleeting. Ownership of listed companies, 
therefore, tends to be widely dispersed across a large number of shareholders who 
have limited commitment to the organisation’s long-term prospects. Compared 
to those directly employed by the organisation, shareholders are unlikely to be 
exclusively or even mainly dependent on the organisation for their income. Thus, 
shareholder and worker interests may not always coincide, but to keep and attract 
investors, managers give the interests of shareholders priority. As a result, man-
agers’ planning horizons are shorter and greater importance is attached to the 
movement in quarterly financial indicators on which shareholders concentrate 
most (Konzelmann, Conway, Trenberth, & Wilkinson, 2006; Dickerson, Gibson, 
& Tsakalotos, 1995).
This theoretical position has received empirical support from two types of evi-
dence (Aspara, Pajunen, Tikkanen, & Tainio, 2014; Hughes, 2014). One approach is 
to look at current share prices and assess how closely they reflect future dividends. 
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4  A. FElsTEAd
Short-termism occurs where current share prices are below the level predicted by 
future earnings. In this situation, investors are acting myopically by attributing too 
low a present value to the stock’s future earnings (i.e. discounting the future too 
heavily). Several studies have examined the share prices and dividend payments of 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange using this approach (Davies, Haldane, 
Nielsen, & Pezzini, 2014; Miles, 1993). They conclude that there is significant 
evidence of stock market myopia. Moreover, research shows that in comparison 
to their Australian, German, Japanese and US counterparts, those who invest 
on the London Stock Exchange are ‘markedly short-termist with medium- and 
long-horizon cash flows being consistently, and relatively highly, underweighted 
in current stock market valuations’ (Black & Fraser, 2000, p. 39).
Another approach to detecting myopia is to survey the attitudes of corporate 
decision-makers to investigate whether they believe they are judged by stock 
market performance. A survey of finance directors, for example, found that invest-
ment decisions were taken with a closer eye on what impact these decisions had 
on short-term stock market performance than on the long-term benefits these 
investments might eventually yield (Grinyer, Russell, & Collison, 1998). Similarly, 
a survey of board directors suggests that the perception of short-term pressures 
from the stock market means that more emphasis is given to R&D projects with 
a quick, predictable and safe return (Demirag, 1998).
Unlisted companies, on the other hand, operate on ‘insider-orientated’ prin-
ciples (Gospel & Pendleton, 2005). For these companies, there is no organised 
market where shares are bought and sold, hence the route to exit for existing 
shareholders is limited. In addition, without a market for shares, management 
performance cannot be assessed by movements in the share price, thereby remov-
ing this source of control. As a result, the theory suggests that time horizons for 
investments in unlisted companies are longer.
Corporate governance theory, then, suggests that ‘outsider-orientated’ compa-
nies are more constrained than those with an ‘insider-orientation’. This can have an 
impact on HRM practices leading to a reduction in management-worker dialogue 
over workplace change, reduced autonomy for workers in terms of how work is 
carried out and greater use of individualised systems of pay (Conway et al., 2008). 
It can also have an important bearing on how organisations respond to changing 
economic conditions and how these responses affect workplace outcomes such as 
training activity (Gospel & Pendleton, 2005; Black, Gospel, & Pendleton, 2007). 
In line with this paper’s overarching hypothesis, then, the expectation is that 
establishment-level training activity is likely to be lower and more susceptible to 
cutbacks where enterprises are listed on the stock market compared to otherwise 
identical private sector establishments. However, existing evidence is weak. For 
example, analysis of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 (WERS04) 
does ‘not support the argument that stock market listed workplaces are less likely 
to provide training than other private sector workplaces’ (Pendleton & Deakin, 
2007, pp. 348–349). In fact, listed workplaces were found to have a statistically 
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higher probability of training larger proportions of workers. Nevertheless, the 
amount of training given in listed workplaces did not differ significantly from 
other parts of the private sector.
There is a second source of short-termism, unrelated to the actual or perceived 
preferences of financiers as expressed in stock market pressures. This is referred 
to as ‘managerial opportunism’, and is generated within businesses (Laverty, 1996; 
Jackson & Petraki, 2011). It stems from the fact that managers have their own 
objectives and ambitions which are shaped by how their achievements are rec-
ognised by employers (Narayanan, 1985). As a result, managers take decisions 
which produce short-term results that serve their own interests at the expense of 
decisions which might be more favourable for the organisation in the long-term. 
This is a condition known as moral hazard. It is made worse by compensation 
packages based on performance measures such as bottom line profit. A review of 
payment systems in 45 large corporate entities in the UK, US and Germany, for 
example, shows that managers’ time horizons are shortened the more closely their 
pay is linked to profits and/or market share, and vice versa (Coates et al., 1995). 
Labour turnover among managers – through internal or external job moves – 
also means that managers tend to favour short-term projects over long-term ones 
since they are better placed to claim credit for projects they initiate and deliver. 
Managers who champion long-term projects, on the other hand, risk not being 
able to take the credit (and rewards) when the project eventually delivers favour-
able outcomes (Laverty, 2004).
On the basis of managerial opportunism, one would expect short-term manag-
ers to quickly react to falling output by laying off staff, thereby protecting short-
term profits on which their own reputations and rewards are based. However, 
quickly shedding labour carries long-term costs if the productive capacity of the 
business and its ability to grow and maintain future market share is weakened. On 
the other hand, long-term employers are more likely to hoard labour in the face 
of a falling order book. Despite sacrificing a fall in short-term profits, additional 
training might even be given to existing employees to make them more productive 
and better able to increase future market share.
Managerial opportunism, and hence short-termism, can also be reflected in 
the organisation’s capacity for innovation in the field. Becoming a market leader, 
and maintaining that position, requires significant investment. The discovery and 
development of break-through products and/or the pioneering of new production 
methods are costly undertakings. They are also risky and uncertain and, even if 
successful in generating long-term payoffs, managers who secured the necessary 
resources may not get the credit. Market leadership, therefore, is indicative of 
organisations which are willing to invest in the long-term. The expectation, then, 
is that relatively high levels of training activity will be part of a market leadership 
strategy and more insulated from cuts in times of recession. Those who simply 
implement and mimic the changes not of their own making, on the other hand, 
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6  A. FElsTEAd
are likely to give investment in training a low priority with the training they do 
provide being more susceptible to cuts in an economic downturn.
3. Data sources, dependent variables and measures of short-termism
3.1. Data sources
This paper is based on an analysis of the National Employer Skills Survey carried 
out in March to July 2009 (NESS2009). A total of 67,599 private sector establish-
ments operating in England took part in telephone interviews lasting 10–20 min. 
Respondents were the most senior person responsible for human resource and 
personnel issues at the site. Interviewees provided information on the level of 
training activity undertaken in the last 12 months and the reported impact of 
the 2008–2009 recession on this activity. The survey also collected some data 
on short-termism. However, the research reported here makes improvements to 
the latter by matching into this data-set information collected from two admin-
istrative sources. First, from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) data-
base, information is extracted relating to stock market listing. Secondly, data are 
imported on employment and turnover change in the two-year period up to the 
time establishments were surveyed for NESS2009. These data are taken from the 
relevant Business Structure Databases (BSD). These two different administrative 
data sources, then, provide enhanced measures of two of the three proxies for 
short-termism examined in this paper, namely stock market listing and changes 
to the labour-output ratio.
However, it must be remembered that not all NESS2009 respondents agreed to 
their survey data being linked to administrative sources. Around a fifth refused to 
give their consent to data linkage. Furthermore, incomplete data records meant 
that common identifier codes were successfully added to around half of these 
establishment addresses (Evans & Welpton, 2009). Administrative data of the 
type outlined above were added to the resulting sample of 33,319 private sector 
establishments. The multivariate analyses which follow are based on this reduced 
sample with all of this analysis carried out in the ESRC’s Secure Data Service 
(SDS).1 The descriptive statistics, on the other hand, are based on the full sample 
of 67,599 establishments where appropriate (non-training employers, for example, 
were not asked follow-up questions about non-existent training activity).
The loss of around half of the original sample raises the possibility that the 
reported results based on the reduced sample are biased. To examine this bias a 
series of logistic regressions were carried out. These show that the reduced sample 
is, for example, skewed towards smaller workplaces and those operating in the 
hotel and restaurant sector, while under-representing establishments in finance 
and transport. Also over-represented are establishments offering training, hence 
biasing the sample and reducing the number of establishments who chose not 
to invest in training at all and possibly excluding establishments where the links 
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between the decision to undertake training or not and short-termism are strong-
est. However, the reduced sample does not differ significantly from the full sample 
in terms of the other dependent variables, namely training volume and recession- 
induced changes to the amount spent on training and the proportion of workers 
trained. Nonetheless, these sample biases are recognised and acknowledged, and 
need to be borne in mind when interpreting the results.
3.2. Dependent variables
The paper analyses four dependent variables focusing on training incidence, vol-
ume and two recession-induced changes to training activity. The derivation of 
each is briefly outlined in what follows. Respondents to NESS2009 were asked 
whether over the past 12 months they had ‘funded or arranged any off-the-job 
training or development for employees at this site’ or whether they had ‘funded or 
arranged any on-the-job or informal training and development’. Establishments 
are defined as trainers or non-trainers accordingly. The training incidence rate, 
therefore, refers to the proportion of establishments undertaking training regard-
less of the extent to which they were doing so. However, as a follow-up, those 
providing training were asked how many staff they had trained over that period 
and for how many days on average. By multiplying these two figures and then 
dividing the result by the number of workers on the payroll at the establishment, 
an establishment-level estimate of training volume is derived with the intensity 
indicator for non-trainers set at zero. However, those undertaking training but 
failing to provide an estimate of how many they were training and for how long, 
had to be dropped from this part of the analysis (hence the sample sizes vary 
accordingly, cf. Table 1).
The final two dependent variables focus on the impact of the recession on train-
ing activity. Respondents were asked: ‘As a result of the [2008–2009] recession have 
the following increased, stayed about the same or decreased at this establishment’. 
A list of eight statements were read out, two of which focused on training activity 
as measured by ‘expenditure on training per employee’ and ‘the proportion of 
employees provided with training’. Those not providing training were routed past 
these two questions and so the sample sizes for these two dependent variables 
fall accordingly. For analytical purposes, those reporting decreases are defined as 
‘cutters’, those reporting no change are denoted as ‘stickers’ and those reporting 
increases are defined as ‘boosters’. Where necessary, these labels are prefixed with 
‘expenditure’ and ‘coverage’ in order to indicate which aspect of training activity 
is under discussion. However, the number of ‘cutters’ may be underestimated 
since it excludes those who cut training as a result of the recession more than 
12 months before the interview. It should also be noted that the coverage and 
expenditure statements apply across all the departments, occupations and contract 
types that constitute the reporting unit, respondents were asked to give an ‘aver-
aged’ account of the impact of the recession on training in the establishment. The 
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training volume indicator is also based on an average estimate of the number of 
days of training each trainee received. Furthermore, all four training variables are 
subject to measurement error since respondents were required to recall activities, 
provide estimates and identify the effects of recession. However, by carrying out 
interviews with the most senior person responsible for HRM at the establishment, 
the research was designed to minimise these errors.
3.3. Measures of short-termism
Management scholars and financial economists have devoted considerable effort 
to examining the existence or otherwise of stock market myopia and its effects 
on business performance. HRM scholars have also begun to examine the con-
nection between corporate governance and the nature of employment relations 
(e.g. Konzelmann et al., 2006; Edwards & Walsh, 2009). However, the data-sets 
HRM scholars use rarely collect information on whether a public limited company 
(PLC) is listed on the stock market or not.
NESS2009 is no different. Like many surveys, it asks respondents whether the 
organisation to which the establishment belongs sells shares to the public, but not 
whether these shares are traded on the stock market, and therefore bought, sold 
and held widely. Analysts are therefore left with imprecise measure of exposure 
to outside pressures. This is a major drawback since stock market listing is the 
key mechanism through which ownership is widely dispersed and short-termism 
is expected to flourish. These short-term pressures may, in turn, translate into 
lower levels of training activity and a greater willingness to cut back on training 
in times of recession. The result is a poorly defined indicator which may conceal 
the full effects of short-termism.
To address this limitation, NESS2009 is enriched with data imported from 
FAME. This is a database comprising financial and descriptive information on 
the UK operations of companies extending over 10 years. For present purposes, 
its importance is that it contains information on the company’s legal form and, in 
particular, whether its shares are quoted on a stock market. To maximise the link-
age, rate historic FAME data relating to June 2009 were used in order to coincide 
with the period of NESS2009 data collection. Using this improved proxy, 1017 
NESS2009 establishments, which were part of a PLC whose shares were listed, 
were identified. According to theory, these are likely to be the establishments most 
exposed to short-termism.
The second indicator of short-termism focuses on employment levels falling 
faster than output as employers protect the present in preference to the future. The 
suggestion here is that short-termist employers are among the quickest to down-
size. This will also be reflected in a lowering of employers’ willingness to invest in 
training and increase in the likelihood that they will cut back on training in times 
of recession. While NESS2009 has a question on how staffing levels have changed 
as a result of the 2008–2009 recession, the responses given only indicate in which 
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10  A. FElsTEAd
direction, if any, establishment staffing levels moved – up, down or remaining the 
same. So, from the raw NESS2009 data, there is no way of telling how significant 
these changes were for the establishment and whether or not these changes were 
above or below the reactions of other establishments operating in the same sector.
The real issue for this paper is the identification of employers who over- or 
under-reacted to changing economic circumstances by cutting employment levels 
faster (or slower) than output. Unfortunately, this information was not collected 
by NESS2009, but employment and financial turnover data of this sort are avail-
able from administrative sources such as BSD. However, BSD collects enterprise 
level data whereas NESS2009 is collected at establishment-level. This presents a 
problem for analysis since for multi-establishment enterprises there is no way of 
knowing how to apportion the reported enterprise-level employment and turnover 
data to establishments. This means that the improved proxy for over/under-re-
action to falling output can only be used for single establishment enterprises. A 
small number of cases were also lost due to the analytical requirement of adding 
in data relating to recent changes employment and turnover which covered the 
period leading up to the time when interviews for NES2009 were carried out. For 
a sub-set of establishments – those operating as single establishment enterprises 
Table 2. multivariate analysis of private sector employer training: incidence, volume and reces-
sion-effects, all establishments operating in england.
Notes. controls were included for sector (13 dummies), region (8 dummies) and workplace size (4 size bands, but 
continuous and squared in linear regressions).
***=1% significance level; **=5% significance level; *=10% significance level.
Source. own analysis of sDs held ness2009 data-set with importation of data from fame, June 2009.
Training Inci-
dence (logistic 
odds ratios)
Training 
Volume (linear 
coefficients)
changes in Training 
Expenditure Per 
capita (ordered probit 
coefficients)
changes in Extent 
of Training cover-
age (ordered pro-
bit coefficients)
Improved Proxy 1
Stock market listing (as 
of June 2009):
Plc stock market listed 2.18*** 2.38* 0.06 0.09
not stock market listed base base base base
Survey-based Proxy 2
Effect of recession on 
staffing:
Increased 1.94*** 1.93** 0.43*** 0.58***
stayed the same base base base base
Decreased 1.23*** 0.44 –0.79*** –0.75***
Survey-based Proxy 3
Market leadership:
often leads the way 1.18*** 1.29*** 0.15*** 0.13***
Between the extremes base base base base
Very rarely leads the 
way
0.67*** –0.66** –0.02 –0.10***
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared/R-
squared
0.11 0.01 0.08 0.09
observations 32,795 28,778 23,900 24,095
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– this improved proxy for changes in the labour-output ratio is entered into the 
regressions, while for the all establishment analysis, the more widely available yet 
less precise survey-based measure is used (cf. Tables 2 and 3).
However, NES2009 does contain a relatively good survey item on market 
leadership. Respondents were asked to compare their establishment with others 
in the industry in terms of the degree to which it exercises market leadership. 
Respondents were asked to position the establishment on a 1–5 scale ranging 
from ‘often lead[s] the way’ ‘in terms of developing new products, services or 
techniques’ at the top to it ‘very rarely lead[s] the way’. In what follows, a three-
point scale of market leadership is created by keeping the top and bottom of the 
scale and collapsing the intermediate categories. This is used in the descriptive 
and multivariate analyses reported below.
Table 3. multivariate analysis of private sector employer training: incidence, volume and reces-
sion-effects, single establishments operating in england.
Notes. controls were included for sector (13 dummies), region (8 dummies) and workplace size (4 size bands, but 
continuous and squared in linear regressions).
***=1% significance level; **=5% significance level; *=10% significance level.
Source. own analysis of sDs held ness2009 dataset with importation of data from fame, June 2009 and BsD for 
2007, 2008 and 2009.
Training inci-
dence (logistic 
odds ratios)
Training 
volume (linear 
coefficients)
changes in training 
expenditure per 
capita (ordered 
probit coefficients)
changes in 
extent of training 
coverage (ordered 
probit coefficients)
Survey-based Proxy 1
Corporate governance:
Plc 1.08 –0.45 0.07 –0.01
not a Plc base base base base
Improved Proxy 2
Recent historic change in 
labour-output ratio com-
pared to sector average, 
2007–2009:
staffing levels falling 
quicker/rising more 
slowly than business 
turnover as compared 
to sector 
0.86*** –1.03*** –0.01 –0.02
staff levels rising quicker/
falling more slowly than 
business turnover as 
compared to sector or at 
the same rate
base base base base
Survey-based Proxy 3
Market leadership:
often leads the way 1.03 0.18 0.12*** 0.12***
Between the extremes base base base base
Very rarely leads the way 0.70*** –0.44 –0.03 –0.08**
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared/R-
squared
0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01
observations 18,261 16,361 12,412 12,438
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12  A. FElsTEAd
The survey also collects some limited background data on establishments. These 
data are used as control variables in the regressions which follow. These controls 
are: economic sector (14 are identified); region (9 areas are specified); and size of 
the establishment (as measured by the number of staff on the payroll regardless 
of their employment status). All the results are weighted to take into account 
reported variations in response rates among establishments and hence produce 
representative results (Shury et al., 2010, Appendix A6).
4. Results
4.1. Descriptives
According to NESS2009, around two-thirds of establishments (65.3%) reported 
that training was undertaken in the 12 months before the survey was carried out. 
In volume terms, this translates into 4.3 days training provided on average for 
every employee in the establishments surveyed. Of those who provided training, 
19.5% said that they had reduced training expenditure per capita, 70.2% made 
no change and 8.0% said that they had boosted their per capita training spend. 
A similar pattern is in evidence as regards training coverage with 13.0% catego-
rised as cutters, 76.9% as stickers and 8.7% as boosters (see Table 1).
What role does short-termism play in whether or not employers provide 
employee training, the volume of training provided and, if they are trainers, how 
do deteriorating economic circumstances impact on variations in training expend-
iture and the proportion of the workforce in receipt of training? The first step in 
answering this question is to cross-tabulate the four dependent variables against 
the three survey-based proxies for short-termism discussed above.
First, we examine the raw corporate governance indicator. In short, the 
cross-tabular results for this indicator fail to support the hypothesis that short- 
termist employers are less likely to train, provide lower volumes of training and 
are more prone to cut back on training in recession. On the contrary, training 
incidence and volume were higher, not lower, in establishments which operated 
as part of a private sector PLC. They also accounted for a higher, again not lower, 
proportion of establishments which boosted rather than cut training expenditure 
and coverage. For example, around a fifth (20.4%) of establishments reporting a 
cut to training coverage were part of a PLC compared to over a quarter (27.3%) 
of establishments reporting a boost. Initially, then, descriptive support for the 
short-term hypothesis is lacking. However, no data are available on whether estab-
lishments were part of an enterprise which was listed on the stock market and at 
greatest exposure to outside pressures. By using a better corporate governance 
measure, deploying multivariate techniques and carrying out significance tests, 
this hypothesis will be subject to further scrutiny later in the paper.
However, other descriptive findings give stronger support for the short- termism 
hypothesis. For example, those who increased staffing as a result of the recession 
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were also among those most likely to offer training to their staff as well as sup-
porting higher volumes of training per employee (see Table 1). This pattern is 
repeated for recession-induced changes to training activity. Among those report-
ing cuts to their training expenditure per capita around three-fifths (60.3%) also 
said that they had reduced staffing levels compared to less than a fifth (18.4%) of 
those who boosted expenditure (see Table 1). The reverse applies with increases 
in staff numbers being closely correlated with boosts to training expenditure. 
Over a quarter (27.3%) of training boosters had increased staffing as a result 
of the recession, whereas only a fraction (4.1%) of cutters reported that they 
had increased training expenditure per head at the same time. The pattern for 
training coverage is similar and, if anything, even more pronounced. However, 
given that new recruits are those who require most training it is perhaps not that 
surprising to find such a relationship. In these circumstances, ceteris paribus, a 
fall in recruitment will necessitate falling per capita training expenditure as well 
as falling training coverage.
A more general drawback of this analysis is that it cannot be deduced from 
these data whether those surveyed were over- or under-reacting to the recession 
since the survey does not provide data benchmarking the actions of establishments 
against those of their peers. In other words, to what extent do responding estab-
lishments report wilder movements in their labour-output ratios as compared to 
the sector average and what associated effects do these exaggerated movements 
have. This drawback is addressed using improved measures taken from admin-
istrative data in the multivariate analyses which follow.
The extent to which the establishment offers market leadership to the sector 
is the third proxy measure of short-termism. The suggestion from the cross- 
tabulations is that market leaders were more likely to offer employees at least some 
training, provide staff with more intensive training and were more likely to boost 
rather than cut training expenditure and coverage as a result of the recession. On 
the other hand, training incidence and volumes were lower among those who 
rarely led the sector with ‘new products, services or techniques’. Less innovative 
employers were also more likely to cut rather than boost training. The column 
percentages rise or fall accordingly and provide some initial support for the short-
term hypothesis (see Table 1).
4.2. Multivariate analyses
The next step in the analysis is to use, where possible, the improved measures 
of short-termism which capture: (a) stock market listing; and (b) changes to 
the labour-output ratio over two years covering the period before, during and 
towards the end of the 2008–2009 recession. In what follows, these improved proxy 
measures of short-termism are used along with the market leadership measure 
taken directly from NESS2009. Where this is not possible, proxies based on sur-
vey responses are used instead. All of these proxies are entered as independent 
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14  A. FElsTEAd
variables, along with limited set of controls, into a series of logistic, linear and 
ordered probits as appropriate (with odds ratios and coefficients reported accord-
ingly). The aim of the procedure is to highlight whether the short-termism proxies 
are significantly correlated with training incidence, the volume of that investment 
and the decision to cut, maintain or boost training activity in the recession.
It is frequently claimed that stock market listing puts pressure on employers to 
adopt a cost-cutting approach to HRM, with training suffering as a consequence. 
Despite this claim, the existing empirical evidence for the connection is weak. 
The FAME enriched NESS09 data allow further scrutiny of this finding and also 
uses, like previous research, training incidence and training volumes as outcome 
indicators. However, the present analysis is based on a representative private sector 
sample much larger than the WERS04 analysis which was based on a sample of 
1563 British workplaces (Conway et al., 2008). In addition, the analysis presented 
in this paper examines whether listed workplaces were more likely than unlisted 
ones to be among those who cut training activity as a result of the recession rather 
than maintaining or boosting it. The results – like those of WERS04 – are not 
consistent with the arguments that listed companies take a more ‘hard-nosed’ 
approach to developing their employees. Instead, listed workplaces were more 
likely to train their staff and offer longer periods of training than non-listed pri-
vate sector establishments (i.e. the odds ratio is significantly greater than one and 
the linear coefficient is positively significant). Furthermore, listing appears to 
make no difference to employers’ willingness to cut or boost training activity as 
a result of the recession, whether measured by training expenditure per head or 
the proportion of workers trained (see Table 2). The results, then, for the impact 
of stock market listing are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions reviewed 
above, thereby providing further doubt on the connection between stock market 
listing and downward pressure on training.
Theories of short-termism predict a positive and significant statistical relation-
ship between establishment-level movements in employment and the provision 
of staff training, and vice versa. Using the survey-based measure of employment 
change, this hypothesis is supported by the data reported here (as indicated by an 
odds ratio exceeding 1, and appropriate negative and positive coefficients in Table 
2). Increases in staffing are associated with an increased propensity to train (as 
compared with establishments which experienced no employment change), higher 
volumes of training and a greater willingness to increase the training activity 
which exists. While for establishments reporting falls in employment, the reverse 
story holds for the recession-induced changes to training activity indicators, but 
falls in staffing levels are not associated with falls in training incidence or volume. 
Furthermore, the control variables suggest that a few sectors, such as hotels and 
restaurants, which have high rates of labour turnover (Heap, 2005) have relatively 
high levels of training per head, after controlling for reported changes to establish-
ment staffing levels. However, there is no evidence of widespread sectoral variation 
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for either this or the other three outcome variables. The findings reported in this 
paper, then, hold regardless of sector.
However, as indicated earlier this survey-based proxy of short-termism does 
not indicate whether employment changes are in line or out of kilter with the 
movement in business turnover and whether these labour-output moves are com-
mon to the sector or not. Data matching rectifies this deficiency by using more 
precise measures of the rapidity with which employment change outpaces (or is 
slower than) changes to financial turnover as benchmarked against the sector aver-
age. We can, therefore, better determine where establishments with short-termist 
tendencies exist and where they do not. However, the matching process restricts 
analysis to single establishments; hence the results here are for a particular sub-set 
of respondents. Not surprisingly, only a few such establishments had their shares 
listed on the stock market and so the survey-based proxy for corporate governance 
is used in these regressions (see Table 3).2
The results confirm the dampening effect that short-termism – as measured 
by sector-benchmarked recent changes to the labour-output ratio – has on an 
establishment’s propensity to offer training and the volume of training per cap-
ita subsequently carried out. That said, this measure does not appear to explain 
movements up or down in training activity as a result of the recession (see Table 
3). So, there is partial, but not complete, support for the detrimental impact that 
short-termism has on employers’ training activity using this particular measure.
Cross-tabular results show that establishments rated as market leaders in the 
field were also those most likely to be among those offering staff training and 
providing higher volumes of training activity than other private sector employ-
ers. Market leaders were also more likely to report that their training activity had 
increased in the recession – both in terms of expenditure per head and employee 
coverage – and least likely to report making cuts. The reverse is true of market 
followers. Broadly speaking, this pattern holds up when subject to more strin-
gent multivariate analysis which hold other factors constant – the coefficients for 
market leaders are positive and significant, while they are negative and significant 
for market followers (see Tables 2 and 3). Here, again, then there is support for 
the downward impact that short-termism has on employers’ training behaviour.
5. Conclusion
This paper is focused on a large survey of employers which was conducted in 
2009, around the time that one of the longest and most severe recessions in Britain 
was officially coming to an end. Employers were asked about whether they had 
offered training to staff in the last 12 months, if so what proportion of staff this 
covered and how long on average this training lasted. Those providing training 
were also asked what impact the recession had on this activity. The data-set, 
therefore, provides establishment-level information about the level of training 
undertaken and its susceptibility to change in times of recession as reported by 
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16  A. FElsTEAd
managers responsible for its delivery. Using these data, the paper tests the con-
nections between short-termism, training and recession.
According to the theoretical literature, short-termism has two main sources. 
The first comes from the corporate governance structure of the organisation and 
outsider scrutiny of managerial decisions. Organisations whose shares are traded 
on the stock market are closely scrutinised by shareholders whose connection to 
the business is purely financial and often short-lived. Their interest is likely to be 
narrowly focused on share price growth and the size of the dividend payout, and 
not on long-term investments in activities such as training. Unlisted companies are 
more ‘internally-orientated’ and are therefore less constrained and more focused 
on the long-term. The second source of short-termism stems from managers’ 
opportunist interest in short-term results that serve personal interests even if at 
the expense of long-term business benefits. Such a mentality is evidenced by a 
quickness to reduce headcounts in the face of falling turnover and a reticence to 
innovate.
In the absence of direct evidence on short-termism, this paper uses three sur-
vey-based proxies as first approximations of the phenomenon. Additional infor-
mation taken from administrative sources is added, where possible, and these 
improved proxies are used instead. By these means, the paper examines what 
impact stock market listing and changing labour-output ratios had on the decision 
to train and for how long as well as on actions to cut, maintain or boost training 
activity as a result of the 2008–2009 recession.
Despite theoretical expectations to the contrary, the paper offers mixed support 
for the association that short-termism has with training. Most strikingly, the weak-
est empirical support for these associations comes where theoretical argument 
for their existence is at its strongest, namely the impact of stock market pressure 
on managerial decision-making. Indeed, in multivariate analyses stock market 
listing is positively, not negatively, correlated with the incidence of establishments 
to offer training and to provide more of it. Furthermore, stock market listing does 
not appear to be associated with reported movements in training expenditure nor 
its coverage across the establishment’s workforce. In line with previous research, 
based on similar but much smaller samples, the paper offers little support for the 
short-termist hypothesis when proxied by stock market listing.
However, in interpreting these results it must be remembered that no direct 
measure of short-termism is available. Instead, the paper uses a number of prox-
ies measured in various ways and using a combination of different data-sets. The 
result may well be that proxies – such as stock market listing – used here and 
elsewhere are not sophisticated enough to capture short-termism or that some 
of the data matching techniques used produce a biased sample. It may be, for 
example, that short-termism is not a particular feature of listed companies as 
a whole, but rather a feature of a particular segment. Case study evidence, for 
example, suggests that listed companies with large continental European pension 
fund shareholders have more latitude to pursue long-termist investment strategies 
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(Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann, & Wilkinson, 2002). On the other hand, private 
limited companies – such as those owned by private equity companies – may be 
more aggressive in pursuing short-term strategies than their stock market listed 
counterparts (Kosman, 2009). The result may be that stock market listing is a blunt 
proxy for short-termism and therefore it may not adequately identify businesses 
which take actions in the present for quick gains.
Nevertheless, stronger evidence is provided by other proxies linking short- 
termism with the level of, and changes to, training activity. Movements in the 
labour-output ratio (benchmarked against the sector average) and market lead-
ership indicators are both significantly correlated with the decision to train, the 
volume of training undertaken and the resilience of training to an economic 
downturn (at least in the case of market leadership).
There is, then, evidence in this paper to suggest that short-termism is detri-
mental to training activity, albeit not as a result of stock market listing as many 
theoretical predictions suggest, but as a result of more widespread managerial 
opportunism. However, to make further headway in the debate, better measures of 
short-termism need to be developed, perhaps using direct indicators of managers’ 
attitudes such as those pioneered by some of the management research which 
has inspired this paper. The recent interest in short-termism and its impact on 
economic performance by policy-makers may prove the additional spur needed to 
collect the necessary data, and so place the study of short-termism and its effects 
on HRM issues such as training on a sounder and more robust empirical footing.
Notes
1.  However, a few respondents failed to answer all of the questions necessary for the 
runs reported in Table 2, hence the difference with the total sample reported here.
2.  It is not possible to run Tables 2 and 3 on the same samples since the two improved 
proxies can only be applied to different sub-sets of the sample. Furthermore, the 
outcome variables address different issues; two focus on the extent of training (with 
zero a possibility) and two on the susceptibility of pre-existing training to economic 
pressures. However, additional runs keeping the sample sizes of the two measures of 
the former and the two of the latter the same produce results very similar to Tables 
2 and 3.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on research findings from a LLAKES-affiliated research project entitled 
‘Training in Recession: Historical, Comparative and Case Study Perspectives’. It was funded 
by the ESRC/UKCES Strategic Partnership (RES-594-28-0001-01). The research reported 
here is based on a combination of data-sets. These include the National Employer Skills 
Survey 2009, the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) BSD 2007–2009 and an extract from 
FAME for June 2009. A special version of NESS2009 was lodged with Secure Data Service, 
where the enriching process and subsequent analysis was carried out. The use of the data 
reported in this paper does not imply the endorsement of ONS, the Secure Data Service, UK 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
4:0
0 1
6 M
ay
 20
16
 
18  A. FElsTEAd
Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES), or the ESRC in relation to the interpreta-
tion or analysis of the data. In carrying out the matching process and getting to grips with the 
BSD and FAME, I would like to thank Richard Welpton, Rhys Davies, Tom Haines and Max 
Munday. Particular thanks must go to my co-collaborators on this project – Francis Green 
and Nick Jewson. Also thanks must go to the editor and the referees for their constructive and 
useful comments. However, the usual caveat applies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
ORCID
Alan Felstead   http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8851-4289
References
Aspara, J., Pajunen, K., Tikkanen, H., & Tainio, R. (2014). Explaining corporate short-termism: 
Self-reinforcing processes and biases among investors, the media and corporate managers. 
Socio-Economic Review, 12, 667–693.
Barker, R. (2012). Getting to grips with short-termism. London: Institute of Directors.
BIS. (2012, February). The Kay review of UK equity markets and long-term decision making: 
Final Report (URN 12/917). London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.
Black, A. J., & Fraser, P. (2000). International Comparisons on Stock Market Short-termism: How 
different is the UK Experience? (pp. 35–50). Supplement: Manchester School.
Black, B., Gospel, H., & Pendleton, A. (2007). Finance, corporate governance, and the 
employment relationship. Industrial Relations, 46, 643–650.
Boxall, P., Purcell, J., & Wright, P. (Eds.). (2007). Oxford handbook of human resource 
management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coates, J., Davies, T., & Stacey, R. (1995). Performance measurement systems, incentive reward 
schemes and short-termism in multinational companies: A note. Management Accounting 
Research, 6, 125–135.
Conway, N., Deakin, S., Konzelmann, S., Petit, H., Rebérioux, A., & Wilkinson, F. (2008). The 
influence of stock market listing on human resource management: Evidence for France and 
Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 46, 631–673.
Cox, G. (2013). Overcoming short-termism within British business: The key to sustained 
economic growth. London: Labour Party. Retrieved from www.yourbritain.org.uk/
agenda-2015/policy-review/tackling-short-termism-the-cox-report
Davies, R., Haldane, A. G., Nielsen, M., & Pezzini, S. (2014). Measuring the costs of short-
termism. Journal of Financial Stability, 12, 16–25.
Deakin, S., Hobbs, R., Konzelmann, S., & Wilkinson, F. (2002). Partnership, ownership and 
control: The impact of corporate governance on employment relations. Employee Relations, 
22, 335–352.
Demirag, I. S. (1998). ‘Boards of Directors’ Short-term perceptions and evidence of managerial 
short-termism in the UK. The European Journal of Finance, 4, 195–211.
Dickerson, A. P., Gibson, H. D., & Tsakalotos, E. (1995). Short-termism and underinvestment: 
The influence of financial systems. The Manchester School, 43, 351–367.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
4:0
0 1
6 M
ay
 20
16
 
THE InTErnATIonAl JournAl oF HumAn rEsourcE mAnAgEmEnT  19
Edwards, T., & Walsh, J. (2009). Foreign ownership and industrial relations. In W. Brown, 
A. Bryson, J. Forth, & K. Whitfield (Eds.), The evolution of the modern workplace (pp. 285–
306). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, P., & Welpton, R. (2009). Business structure database: The inter-departmental business 
register (IDBR) for research. Economic and Labour Market Review, 3, 71–75.
Felstead, A., Green, F., & Jewson, N. (2012). An analysis of the impact of the 2008–9 recession 
on the provision of training in the UK. Work, Employment and Society, 26, 968–986.
Gospel, H., & Pendleton, A. (2005). Corporate governance and labour management: An 
international comparison. In H. Gospel & A. Pendleton (Eds.), Corporate governance and 
labour management: An international comparison (pp. 1–32). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Grinyer, J., Russell, A., & Collison, D. (1998). Evidence of managerial short-termism in the 
UK. British Journal of Management, 9, 13–22.
Heap, D. (2005). Job separations in the UK. Labour Market Trends, 113, 231–238.
Hughes, A. (2014). Short-termism, impatient capital and finance for manufacturing innovation 
in the UK. (Working Paper No. 457). Cambridge: Centre for Business Research, University 
of Cambridge.
Jackson, G., & Petraki, A. (2011). How does corporate governance lead to short-termism? In 
S. Vitols & N. Kluge (Eds.), The sustainable company: A new approach to corporate governance 
(pp. 199–225). Brussels: European Trade Union Institute.
Konzelmann, S., Conway, N., Trenberth, L., & Wilkinson, F. (2006). Corporate governance and 
human resource management. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44, 541–567.
Kosman, J. (2009). The buyout of America: How private equity will cause the next great credit 
crisis. New York, NY: Penguin.
Laverty, K. J. (1996). Economic “short-termism”: The debate, the unresolved issues, and the 
implications for management practice and research. Academy of Management Review, 21, 
825–860.
Laverty, K. J. (2004). Managerial myopia or systemic short-termism? The importance of 
managerial systems evaluating the long term Management Decision, 42, 949–962.
Miles, D. (1993). Testing for short termism in the UK stock market. The Economic Journal, 
103, 1379–1396.
Miliband, E. (2012, January 19). Our toxic blend of capitalism and short-termism. Financial 
Times.
Narayanan, M. P. (1985). Managerial incentives for short-term results. The Journal of Finance, 
40, 1469–1484.
Pendleton, A., & Deakin, S. (2007). Corporate governance and workplace employment relations: 
The potential of WERS 2004. Industrial Relations Journal, 38, 338–355.
Shury, J., Winterbotham, M., Davies, B., Oldfield, K., Spilsbury, M., & Constable, S. (2010). 
National employer skills survey for England 2009: Key findings report. Wath-upon-Dearne: 
Commission for Employment and Skills.
UKCES. (2008, October 23). “Slash training at your peril” warn business bosses. Open Letter 
published in the Financial Times.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
4:0
0 1
6 M
ay
 20
16
 
